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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the effect of enforcement of IPR on the 
equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing 
decisions between duopolistic firms with patents of two complementary 
technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the 
infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under 
that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between 
them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes. 
1 Introduction 
In some industries, one feature of recent technological innovation is that the 
firms cannot produce a commodity without using the outcome of plural dis-
tinct inventions. Especially in information technology (IT) industries, one 
product is comprised of numerous separable patentable elements. For exam-
ple, the production of a mobile phone having a digital camera involves about 
19,000 (Japanese) patents and/or utility models.! In this environment, which is 
named "cumulative-systems technologies" (Merges and Nelson [3]) or "complex 
technologies" (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [2]), the inventors of the separable 
patentable elements tend to be different economic agents. In such cases, the 
coordination among these inventors affects the interests of each inventor and 
also affects their R&D incentives. In fact, over the last decade of the previous 
century, a few of studies discussed the effects of the relationships among inven-
tions on incentives for R&D, licensining, the enforcement of patent systems and 
social welfare. Aoki and Hu[l], Okamura, Shinkai and Tanaka[5] explore this 
problem in the economic literature. 
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Recently, governments in many developed countries including U.S., EU mem-
bers countries and Japan has been strengthend their policies for protection in-
tellectual property rights(IPR) of their domestic rightsholders. These strength 
of protection policies of IPR certainly make courts easier relieve their domes-
tic rightsholders for infringment of IPR. Whether these policies improves social 
welfare or not is not clear when we are in complex technologies environment, 
especially there exhists complementary among technologies or inventions. As 
we typically have seen in the IT industries, technological innovations occur on 
the basis of plural distinct inventions developed in different systems of tech-
nologies. In this environment, distinct technologies are complementary to each 
other as parts of the product produced. In order to explore the effects of 
the relationships among inventions and the enforcement of patent systems on 
social welfare, we incorpolates the probability that the plaintiff(rightsholder) 
wins the lawsuit for infringement of his IPR and imitation cost of infringer into 
our model. We examine what kind of licensing contract form are desirable 
from the social welfare point of view under some states of nature of the pair of 
legitimate availability of technology that each firm faces. 
In section 2, we describe our model. In section 3, we derive a equilibrium 
when one firm's unilateral licensing of two technologies to another firm occurs. 
In section 4, we derive a equilibrium when one firm's unilateral licensing of one of 
the two technologies to another firm occurs. Then, we derive a equilibrium when 
cross-licensing occurs and comparing among three cases.In the final section, we 
present our concluding remarks. 
2 The model 
We consider a market in which two firms x and y plan to produce and sup-
ply a good. For production of the good, each firm must use two distinct new 
completely complementary technologies, A and B for process innovation. Each 
firm has already invested in R&D for the these two technologies, A and B, and 
we know whether they have succeeded in their R&D developments or not, so 
we also know the states of nature which are their availability of technologies 
when they produce the good. By "perfectly complementary technologies," we 
mean that neither firm can produce the goods without using both of the two 
technologies. 
In this paper, we assume that there exists a possibility of spilover of technolo-
gies. That is, each firm can produce a good even if it fails to develop a technol-
ogy / technologies by infringing its rival's intelectual property rights(IPR) when 
its rival has succeeded in the development of technology/technologies. But each 
firm incurs a constant imitation cost h > 0 if it infringes its rival's IPR. However, 
IPR holder can litigate her rival for infringement of her IPR. With probability 
8, the plaintiff wins the lawsuit. We look the probability 8(0 ~ 8 ~ 1) as the 
magnituides of the government's protection of IPR. Throughout this paper, we 
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ignore the litigation cost for simplicity of the analysis, though it is important 
in real litigation against the infringement of IPR's. We explore how licensing 
contract forms (unilateral licensing or cross licensing) between firms affects on 
market outcomes and welfare when there exist infringement and litigation in 
this paper. 
B, 
Let denote AB, if it succeeds in the development of both technologies A and 
A(B), if it succeeds in the development of technologies A or B, where, 
¢>, if it fails to develop both technologies A and B. 
Then, possible states of nature of the pair of legitimate availability of tech-
nology that each firm faces are expressed as Table 1. 
Insert here Table 1 
For that purpose of the analysis, we concentrates on the three states of na-
ture, (¢> , AB), (A or B, AB), (A(B), B(A)). For the first and the second cases, 
a unilateral licensing may occur, and a cross licensing may occur for the third 
case. By symmetry of the firms, we assume that only firm y can decide whether 
it offers licensing to firm x or not. If each firm fails to develop a technology / 
technologies, it can choose whether it infringes its rival's IPR and operates in 
the market or exits. The market structure, that is, whether monopoly or duo-
ploy prevails depends on the licensing contracts and infringements and states of 
nature of the pair of legitimate availability of technology each firm faces. 
The timing of each corresponding game for these three cases are expressed 
by the game tree in Figures 1, 3 and 5. 
3 Firm y's unilateral licensing of both technolo-
gies to firm x- Case a 
We consider case 1 in Table 1 in this subsection. We can express the game as 
an exten~ive form game in Figure 1. We derive a sub game perfect equilibrium 
for this game. 
Insert here Figure 1 
3.1 Firm y's decision at the nodes Y2 and Y3 
At the nodes Y2 and in Y3 in Figure 1, firm y decides whether she litigates firm x 
or not since firm x infringes firm y's technologies at the node X3. since (hr D > 0, 
firm y necessary litigates firm x (chooses L). Then, firm x infringes firm y's 
technologies A and B (chooses I) / exits from the market, if (1- fJ)7r D - 2h ~ 0 
/ if otherwise, at the nodes X2 and in X3. 
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3.2 Firm x's decision at the nodes Xl 
3.2.1 a-(i)(l- O)7rD - 2h:::: 0 
Suppose that (1 - O)7rD - 2h :::: 0, so firm x chooses I at the nodes X2 and 
in X3' Suppose also that firm y offers a license of her technologies A and B 
with the fixed license fee F; to firm x at node Yl' Note that payoffs (7rD - F; , 
7rD + F;) / «1 - O)7rD - 2h, (1 + O)7rD), if firm x accepts / rejects the offer. Then 
firm x accepts it if 7rD - F; :::: (1 - O)7rD - 2h. Now, we solve F; for this Nash 
bargaining game. 
The Nash bargaining product is defined as follows: n l == [7rD - F; - {(I -
O)7rD - 2h)][ 7rD + F; - (1 + O)7rD]. 
anI 1 D 
aFl = -2Fy + 207r + 2h = 0 
y 
F; = (l7r D + h (1) 
From, 7rD - F; = 7rD - (07rD + h) = (1 - O)7rD - h > (1 - O)7rD - 2h. So 
firm x accepts the offer at the node Xl if firm y offer the license to firm x. We 
see that 7rD + F; = (1 - O)7rD + h > (1 - O)7rD. The payoff in the right 
hand side of this inequality is the firm y's payoff when firm y does not offer the 
license at node Yl. Hence firm y offers the license to firm x at node Yl. 
3.2.2 a-(ii)(l - O)7rD - 2h < 0 
Suppose that (1 - O)7rD - 2h < 0, so firm x chooses E at the nodes X2 and in 
X3. Note that payoffs (7rD - F;, 7rD + F;) /(0, 7rM), if firm x accepts/ rejects 
the offer. Then firm x accepts it if 7rD - F; :::: 0 at node Xl. Now, we solve F; 
for this Nash bargaining game. 
The Nash bargaining product is defined as follows: n2 == [7rD - F; - 0][ 
7rD + F; - 7rM ]. 
an2 1 M 
- =-2F +7r =0 aF:; y 
F 2 1 M y = 2'7r (2) 
We see that 7rD - F; = 7rD - ~7rM = H27rD - 7rM) < O. Hence firm x 
rejects the offer at node Xl. So the payoff (0, 7rM)/ «1- O)7rD - 2h, (1 + O)7rD) 
realizes, if firm y does not offer(NO)/ does offer (O)the license at node Yl. 
Since 7r M > (1 + O)7rD, firm y does not (0) it at node Yl. Denote by si(ij), the 
strategy (action) that firm i takes at node ij (i = x,Yjj = 1,2,3,k = a),where 
k stands for case k in Table 1. Summarizing the above discussIon, we obtain 
the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1 If (1- 8)1rD - 2h ;::: 0, then the sub game perfect equilibrium is 
((sy(yf), Sy(y~), Sy(y~)), (s:r(xf), s:r(x~), s:r(x~))} = {CO, L, L), (A, I, I)}, and 
the correspondent payoffs are (1rD - F;, 1rD + F;) where F; = 81rD + h. When 
(1 - 8)1rD - 2h < O,the sub game perfect equilibrium is 
{(sy(yf), SY(Y2)' Sy(y~)), (sx(xn sx(x~), sx(x~))} = {(NO, L, L), (R, E, E)}, 
and the correspondent payoffs are (0,1r M ). 
For case a, we can draw the parameters range where duopoly or monopoly 
occurs at equilibria in 8 - h plane in Figure 2. 
Insert here Figure 2 
4 Firm y's unilateral licensing of one technology 
A or B to firm x- Case b 
We consider case c in Table 1 in this subsection. We can express the game as 
an extensive form game in Figure 3. We derive a sub game perfect equilibrium 
for this game. 
Insert here Figure 3 
4.1 Firm y's decision at the nodes Y2 and Y3 
At the nodes Y2 and in Y3 in Figure 2, firm y decides whether she litigates firm x 
or not since firm x infringes firm y's technologies at the node X3. since 81rD > 0, 
firm y necessary litigates firm x (chooses L). Then, firm x infringes firm y's 
technologies A and B (chooses I) / exits from the market, if (1 - 8)1rD - h ;::: ° 
/ if otherwise, at the nodes X2 and in X3. 
4.2 b-{i)(l - O)7fD - h ~ 0 
Suppose that (1 - 8)1rD - h ;::: 0, so firm x chooses I at the nodes X2 and in 
X3. Suppose also that firm y offers a license of her technology A or B with the 
fixed license fee F; to firm x at node Yl. Note that payoffs (1rD - F;, 1rD +F;) 
/«1 - 8)1rD - h, (1 + 8)1rD), if firm x accepts/ rejects the offer. Then firm x 
accepts it if 1rD -F; ;::: (1-8)1rD -h. Now, we solve F; for this Nash bargaining 
game. 
The Nash bargaining product is defined as follows: n3 == [1rD - F; - {(I -
8)1rD - h}][ 1rD + F; - (1 + 8)1rD]. 
an3 
- = - 2p3 + 281rD + h = ° of: y 




From, 7rD - F; = 7r D - ((l7r D + ~h) = (1 - 8)7rD - ~h > (1 - 8)7rD - h. 
So firm x accepts the offer at the node Xl if firm y offers the license to firm x. 
We see that 7rD + F; = (1- 8)7rD + ~h > (1- 8)7rD. The payoff in the right 
hand side of this inequality is the firm y's payoff when firm y does not offer the 
license at node YI. Hence firm y offers the license to firm x at node YI' 
4.2.1 b-(ii)(1 - 8)7rD - h < ° 
Suppose that (1 - 8)7rD - h < 0, so firm x chooses E at the nodes X2 and in 
X3. Note that payoffs (7rD - Fi, 7r D + Fi) /(0, 7rM ), if firm x accepts/ rejects 
the offer. Then firm x accepts it if 1fD - Fi ~ ° at node Xl. Now, we solve Fi 
for this Nash bargaining game. 
The Nash bargaining product is defined as follows: n4 == [7rD - Fi - 0][ 
7r D + Fi - 7r M ]. Comparing n4 with n2 , we immediately see that rr4 = rr2 , 
hence Fi = F; = ~7rM. 
We see that 7r D - Fi = 7rD - ~7rM = H27rD - 7rM) < 0. Hence firm x 
rejects the offer at node Xl. So the payoff (0, 7rM) / (1 - 8)7rD - h, (1 + 8)7rD) 
realizes, if firm y does not offer(NO)/ does offer (O)the license at node YI. Since 
7rM > (1 + 8)7rD, firm y does not (0) it at node YI. Summarizing the above 
discussion, we obtain the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 If (1 - 8)7rD - h ~ 0, then the sub game perfect equilibrium 
is {(Sy(Y~), Sy(Y~), sy(y~)), (sx(xn, sx(x~), sx(xm} = {(O, L, L), (A,I,In, and 
the correspondent payoffs are (7r D -F;, 7rD +F;) where F; = 87rD + ~h. When 
(1 - 8)7rD - h < O,the sub game perfect equilibrium is 
{(Sy(YV, Sy(y~), Sy(ym, (sx(xn, sx(x~), sx(x~))} = {(NO, L, L), (R, E, En, 
and the correspondent payoffs are (0, 7rM ). 
For case b, we can draw the parameters range where duopoly or monopoly 
occurs at equilibria in 8 - h plane in Figure 4. 
Insert here Figure 4 
5 Firm y's cross licensing offer - Case c 
We consider case c in Table 1 in this subsection where each firm has a patent 
of distinct technology. We can express the game as a complex extensive form 
game in Figure 5. We derive a sub game perfect equilibrium for this game. 
Here we assume that only firm y offers cross license to firm x for simplicity and 
consistency of our discussion on all cases a, band c in Table 1. 
Insert here Figure 5 
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5.1 Firm x's decision at the nodes X4, X5, X6, X7, Xg and Xg 
Note that firm y does infringe firm x's patent at the preceding node of each of 
X4, XS, X6, X7, Xs and Xg. 
At nodes X4 and xs, firm x always litigates firm y from assumption 8-rrM > 
8-rrD > O. Similarly, we can conclude that firm x always litigates firm y at 
nodes X6, X7, Xs and Xg from assumption since 8-rrM > 8-rrD > O. -rrD - h > 
(1 - 8)-rrD - h ~ 8-rrD > 0 ~ (1 + 8)-rrD - h > -rrD - h. 
5.2 Firm y's decision at the nodes Y3, Y5, Y6, Y7, yg and yg 
Note that firm y chooses her decision at the nodes Y3, Ys, Y6, Y7, Ys and Yg, under 
the supposition that firm x always litigates firm y at nodes X6, X7, Xs and Xg. 
From this fact and the game tree in Figure 5, we can easily derive the following 
lemma. 
D 
Lemma 3 If ~ > 8 and -rrD - h 2': 8-rrM , then firm Y infringes firm x's patent, 
but if ;; > 8 and -rrD - h < 8-rrM, or ;; ::; 8, then she exits from the market 
at the nodes Ys and Y6. At the nodes Y3, Ys, Y7 and Yg, if (1 - 8)-rrM - h 2': 0, 
then firm Y infringes firm x's patent, but if h 2': (1 - 8)-rrM, then she exits from 
the market. 
5.3 Firm y's decision at the nodes Y2 and Y4 
When -rrD -8-rrM > hand;; > 8, firm y infringes at all the nodes Y3, Ys, Y6, Y7, Ys 
and yg from the above lemma. When ~ > 8 and -rrD - h < 8-rrM, or 
~ ::; 8, then she exits from the market at the nodes Ys and Y6, but firm 
y infringes all the nodes Y3, Ys, Y7 and yg. So when -rrD - 8-rrM > hand 
D ~ > 8, if -rrD - h 2': (1 - 8)-rrD - h then firm y litigates firm x but does 
not litigate otherwise at the nodes Y2 and Y4. However, firm y always liti-
gates at these nodes since -rrD - h 2': (1 - 8)-rrD ~ 8-rrD 2': 0 and the latter 
D inequality holds from the assumption. When ~ > 8 and -rrD - h < 8-rrM, or 
~ ::; 8, if h > max{(1 - 8)-rrD - 8-rrM, O}, then firm y litigates firm x , but 
if h ::; max{(1 - 8)-rrD - 8-rrM, O}, then does not litigate at the nodes Y2 and 
Y4. If (1 - 8)-rrM > h 2': max{ -rrD - 8-rrM, O}, then firm y infringes at the nodes 
Y3, Ys, Y7 and Yg, but exits from the market at the nodes Y6 and Ys. Taking into 
account these facts and from Fifure 5, firm y's optimal decision at the nodes Y2 
and Y4 can be characterize as follows: If h > max{(1- 8)-rrD - 8-rrM,0}, then 
firm y should litigate firm x , but if h ::; max{ (1- 8)-rrD - 8-rrM, O}, then should 
not litigate at the nodes Y2 and Y4. When h 2': (1 - 8)-rrM, from the lemma, 
firm y exits from the market at all the nodes Y3, Ys, Y6, Y7, Ys and yg. However, 
from Figure 5, the realizing firm y's payoff when firm y litigates is 8-rrM, which 
is greater than 0, the realizing firm y's payoff when firm y does not, so firm y 
should litigate firm x in this case. Sumarizing the above discussion, we obtain 
the following lemma. 
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D Lemma 4 If ;-x. > () and 1rD - ()1r M > h , firm y always litigates firm x 
D D 
at the nodes Y2 and Y4. When ~ > () and 1rD - h < (hM, or ;-x. :s; B or 
(1 - ())1rM > h ~ 1rD - ()1r M, if h > max{(1 - ())1rD - ()1r M, O}, then firm y 
litigates firm x , but if h :s; max{(1 - ())1rD - ()1rM, O}, then does not litigate at 
the nodes Y2 and Y4' When h ~ (1 - ())1rM, firm y litigates firm x at the nodes 
Y2 and Y4' 
5.4 Firm x's decision at the nodes X2 and X3 
From the above two lemmas and the game tree in Figure 5, we immediately see 
that firm x always infringes firm y's patent when ~ > ~ > () and 1rD _()1rM > h 
at the nodes X2 and X3, since 1rD - h > ()1rM, where the left/ right hand side of 
the inequality stands for firm x's payoff when firm x chooses I / E at nodes X2 
and X3: When ~ > ~ > () and (1 - ())1rM > h ~ 1rD - ()1rM, we see that if 
1rM - 2()1rM ~ h <=} (1 - ())1rM ~ ()1r M /1rM - 2()1rM < h <=} (1 - B)1rM < ()1rM, 
firm x chooses I / E at nodes X2 and X3 from the above two lemmas and the 
game treei n Figure5.When ~ > 8 and h ~ (1 - ())1rM, firm x also exits from 
the market at nodes X2 and X3 since h ~ (1 - ())1rM. When:;;:S; Band 
1rM - 81rM > h > 0, firm x chooses I / E at nodes X2 and X3 if 1rKf - 2()1rM ~ 
h > 0/ 1rM - 2()1rM :s; h < (1 - B)1rM. But if ~ :s; () and (1 - ())1rM :s; h, 
firm x always exits form the market at nodes X2 and X3 . Sumarizing these, we 
present the following lemma. 
D 
Lemma 5 If ~ > ;-x. >. () and 1rD - ()1r M > h , firm x always infringes firm 
y's patent at the nodes X2 and X3. When t> ~ > () and (1 - ())1rM > h ~ 
1rD - ()1r M, if 1rM - 2()1rM ~ hl1rM - 2()1r < h, then firm x infringes firm 
y's patent lexits from the msrket at nodes X2 and X3. When ~ > () and 
h ~ (1 - ())1rM, firm x also exits from the market at nodes X2 and X3. When 
D ;-x. :s; () and 1rM - ()1r M > h > 0, firm x chooses I IE at nodes X2 and X3 if 
1rM - 2()1rM ~ h > 01 1rM - 2B1rM :s; h < (1 - ())1rM. But if ~ :s; Band 
(1 - ())1rM :s; h, firm x always exits form the market at nodes X2 and X3 • 
5.5 Firm x's/y's decision at the nodes xI! Yl 
From Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and the game tree in Figure 5, firm y always 
offers a cross license contract at node YI and firm x accepts it at node Xl when 
!. > ~ > () and 1rD - ()1r M > h since 1rD >1rD - h. When !. > ~ > () and 2 ",~ , 2 ,,'"' (1- ())1rM > h ~ 1rD - ()1r M, if 1rM _1rD - ()1r M ~ h ~ 1rD - ()1rM /(1- 2())1rM > 
h ~ 1rM - 1rD - ()1r M, then firm y always offers a cross license contract at node 
D 
YI and firm x rejects/accepts it at node Xl. If ~ > ;-x. > () and (1- ())1rM > h ~ 
(1- 2())1rM or h ~ (1- ())1rM , firm y always offers a cross license contract at node 
Yland firm x accepts it at node Xl. When ~ :s; () and 1rM - 1rD - ()1r M ~ h 
> 0, firm y does not offer her cross licence contract at node YI since firm x 
always rejects it t node Xl even if she offer the contract to firm x.at nodes Xl. 
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If h > -rrM - -rrD - (hr M , then firm y always offers a cross license contract at 
node YI and firm x accepts it at node Xl. Sumarizing the above, we present 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 6 Firm Y always offers a cross license contract at node YI and firm x 
D D 
accepts it at node Xl when ~ > ~ > () and -rrD - (}7r M > h. When ~ > ~ > () 
and (1 - (})-rrM > h ~ 7rD - (}7r M , if 7rM - 7rD - (}7r M ~ h ~ 7rD - (}7r M 
/(1 - 2(})7rM > h ~ -rrM - 7rD - (}7r M : then firm Y always offers a cross license 
D 
contract at node YI and firm x rejects/ accepts it at node Xl' If ~ > ~ > () 
and (1- (})7rM > h ~ (1- 2(})7rM or h ~ (1- (})7rM , firm y always offers a cross 
license contract at node YI and firm x accepts it at node Xl' When ~ :::; () and 
7rM - 7rD - (}7rM ~ h > 0, firm Y does not offer her cross licence contract at 
node YI since firm x always rejects it t node Xl' If h > 7rM - 7r D - (}7r M , then 
firm y always offers a cross license contract at node YI and firm x accepts it at 
node Xl. 
5.6 Equilibrium of the Entire Game 
By Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we can obtain the main result 
of this section. 
Proposition 7 When ! > ~ > () and 7rD - (}7rM > h, then the sub game 
perfect equilibrium is 
{CO, L, I, L, I, I, I, 1,1), (A, I, I, L, L, L, L, L, L)} and the correspondent pay-
off is ( 7rD , 7rD ). 
When! > ~ > () and -rrM - 7rD - ()-rrM ~ h ~ 7r D - ()7rM , then the sub game 
perfect equilibrium is{(O, L, I, L, I, E, I, E, I), (R, I, I, L, L, L, L, L, L)} and the 
correspondent payoff is ( (1 - ()7rM - h, (}7rM ). 
D When! > ~ > () and (1-2()7rM > h ~ -rrM _7rD _()7rM , then the sub game 
perfect equilibrium is {(O, L, I, L,1, E, I, E, I), (A, 1,1, L, L, L, L, L, L)} and the 
correspondent payoff is ( 7rD , -rrD ). 
When! > ~ > () and (1 - ()7rM > h ~ (1 - 2()7rM , then the sub 
game perfect equilibrium is {CO, L, I, L, I, E, I, E, I), (A, E, E, L, L, L, L, L, L)} 
and the correspondent payoff is ( 7rD , 7rD ). 
D When! > ~ > () and h ~ (1 - (})7rM , then then the sub game perfect equi-
librium is {(O, L, E, L, E, E, E, E, E), (A, E, E, L, L, L, L, L, L)} and the corre-
spondent payoff is ( -rrD, 7rD ). When ~ :::; () and 7rM _7rD - (}7rM ~ h > 0, then 
the sub game perfect equilibrium is {(NO, L, I, L, I, E, I, E, I), (R, I, I, L, L, L, L, L, L)} 
and the correspondent payoff is ( (1 - (})7rM - h, (}7rM ). 
If ~ :::; () and (1- 2()7rM > h ~ 7rM - 7r D - (}7r M , then the sub game perfect 
equilibrium is {(O,L,1,L,1,E,1,E,1),(A,1,I,L,L,L,L,L,L)} and the corre-
spondent payoff is ( -rrD, -rrD ). If ~ :::; () and (1- (})-rrM > h ~ (1- 2(})7rM , then 
the sub game perfect equilibrium is {CO, L, I, L, I, E, I, E, I), (A, E, E, L, L, L, L, L, L)} 
and the correspondent payoff is ( 7rD , 7rD ). ~ 
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D When ~ ~ () and h ~ (l-())7rM , then then the sub game perfect equilibri'um 
is {(O, L, E, L, E, E, E, E, E), (A, E, E, L, L, L, L, L, L)} and the correspondent 
payoff is ( 7rD , 7rD ). 
For case c, we can draw the parameters range where duopoly or monopoly 
occurs at equilibria in () - h plane in Figure 6. 
Insert here Figure 6 
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 2 and Figure 4, we see that the area of 
duopoly at the equilibrium expands in () - h plane as the state of nature of the 
pair of legitimate availability of technology each firm faces transits from (¢ , AB) 
or (A or B,AB) to (A(B),B(A».Furthermore, in the state (A(B),B(A) in 
which a cross licensing may occur, the possibility that welfare superior duopoly 
market outcome occurs increases as the magnituides of the government's pro-
tection of IPR s () increases. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have explored how licensing contract forms (unilaterallicens-
ing or cross licensing) between firms affects on market outcomes and welfare 
when there exist infringement and litigation. by analyzing a simple duopolistic 
firms facing technological innovation in completely complementary technologies 
for process innovation. In this paper, we assume that there exists a possibil-
ity of spilover of technologies. That is, each firm can produce a good even 
if it fails to develop technologies by infringing its rival's intelectual property 
rights(IPR) when its rival has succeeded in the development of technologies. 
For that purpose of the analysis, we concentrates on the three states of nature, 
(4) ,AB),(A or B,AB), (A(B),B(A»). For the first and the second cases, a 
unilateral licensing may occur, and a cross licensing may occur for the third 
case. We formulated three multi-stage games for these three cases, and derive a 
sub game perfect equilibrium in each cases. Comparing these three equilibria, 
we find that the area of duopoly at the equilibrium expands in () - h plane as 
the state of nature of the pair of legitimate availab,ility of technology each firm 
faces transits from (4) ,AB) or (A or B,AB) to (A(B),B(A»).Furthermore, in 
the state (A(B), B(A)) in which a cross licensing may occur, the possibility that 
welfare superior duopoly market outcome occurs increases as the magnituides 
of the government's protection of IPR s () increases. 
There remain many topics for future research. We focused on the licens-
ing contract game in order to make our analysis easy. Preceding the licensing 
contract stage, however, we have to add firms' R&D competition stage and ex-
plore firm's incentives for R&D. To clarify how governments should plan and 
exercise policy for technologies under complementary technological innovations, 
it is important for us to explore the implications on economic welfare at the 
equilibrium in our model. 
10 
References 
[1] Aoki, Rand J. J., Hu (1999) "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect ofthe Le-
gal System on Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Economics fj Management 
Strategy Vol. 8 No.1 pp.133-160. 
[2] Cohen, W. M., R RNelson and & J. P. Walsh. (2000), "Protecting Their In-
tellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing 
Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Paper, No. 7552. 
[3] Merges, R P., and R. R Nelson. (1994), "On Limiting or Encouraging Ri-
valry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions," Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 25: pp. 1-24. 
[4] Nihon Keizai Shinbun (18 August 2003) 
[5] Okamura, M., T. Shinkai., and & S. Tanaka. (2002), "A Cross-licensing Sys-
tem Discourages R&D Investments in Completely Complementary Technolo-
gies," Working Paper, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, no. 14. 
11 
Not Offer (NO) 
E 
Figure 1 Game tree O 7f M ,











Figure 2 Equilibrium Market Structure in 
states (¢, AB) 
Y\ 
L /- (1-B)7r D -h, (1+B)7r D 
I/Y 
x, / ~ "D_h D· 
Reject(R) /. ' " 
X,/ ~ .~ E 0, 7r M 
Offer (0) 
• 





• 7r D - F3(4),7r D + F3(4) 
L 
• (1-B)7r D - h, (1 + B)7r D 
I ~ 
• 7r D - h, 7r D 
E Y4 













Not Offer (NO) 
I 
E 
Xg ~. JlD-h, JlD-h 
• yg I ----m:--. (l-B)JlD -h,(l+B)JlD-h 
(I-B)JlM~. h,BJlM • (l+B)JlD-h,(l-B)JlD-h 
E •• ~
~ X9 M NL • JlD-h,JlD-h 
• E. Jl -h,O 
L 
NL 
L • M M Xs ____ BJl ,(l-B)Jl -h 
• ~---- ~. O,JlM -h 








Figure 5 Game tree 







Figure 6 Equilibrium Market Structure 
instate (A(B),B(A)) 
() 
